On February 4, it became known that the Israeli government has authorized Aeronautics to sell combat drones to Azerbaijan. After a publication in the Israeli press the ministry of defense of Israel started an investigation and suspended the company’s license to sell combat drones to Azerbaijan. The press reported that the managers of the company participated in the testing of drones in the direction of the Armenian positions, after the ordinary employees had refused to do that. The point is that the managers breached the ban on testing drones on live targets.
The Ministry of Defense of Israel started an investigation, suspending the company’s license for export.
Now Israel has stated that the license and authorization for export are being restored. There is information that managers who tested the drones are deprives of the right to export whereas the ban on export by the company has been lifted.
Of course, this company is not the only one which sold or could sell drones to Azerbaijan, and this is not the problem that Baku could not sell Israeli combat drones.
The issue is political and is within the domain of political signs, and in this sense it is interesting that Israel lifts the ban on supply of drones to Azerbaijan by Aeronautics based on information that became known or was clarified recently. The point is about Prime Minister Pashinyan’s upcoming visit to Iran which he announced during the official visit to Germany.
Israel is definitely among the scrutinizers of the Armenian-Iranian relations, especially considering the foreign policy demonstrating tangible tendencies of enrichment with new content in Armenia.
In this sense, the lift of ban on supply of drones to Azerbaijan looks like a demarche in response to the upcoming visit to Iran, the first high-level Armenian-Iranian mutual visit.
There is no doubt that not only bilateral issues will be on the agenda of the visit to Tehran but also discussions on the political-military potential of the Armenian-Iranian relations of regional importance which will include, most probably, the Near East, including the Armenian humanitarian mission to Syria under the Armenian flag. This is a circumstance with a broad political areal in the context of Armenia as a geopolitical subject.
On the other hand, back in 2017 Tehran did a noticeable demarche against the Israel-Armenia contact when after the visit of the Armenian foreign minister to Israel the Iranian foreign minister urged Armenia not to give in to what the “Zionist regime” is saying. The point is that the press release about the meeting of Edward Nalbandyan and Benjamin Netanyahu expresses concerns about the enlargement of Iran’s presence in the region.
The message released by Yerevan did not contain anything about it but there was no refutation. Why did Israel raise concerns about the enlargement of Iran’s presence in the Near East? What did Israel expect from the Armenian government in November 2017? And what has changed in this regard in the result of change of government in Armenia?
Relations with its political-military partner and friend Iran and with Israel is highly important for Armenia. On the other hand, Armenia should not be dealing with any of them secretly from the other.
At the same time, when it comes to the relations with Armenia, none of the sides should expect to get anything through blackmail. In this sense, the information from Israel on February 4 contains such elements. Apparently, there is a high self-esteem in Tel Aviv from the point of view of relations with Armenia, maybe even a special competitive feeling, considering the civilization that Tel Aviv is trying to place at the heart of its policy or political concept, realizing that Armenia is a serious competitor, and the velvet revolution is an opportunity to turn this to a political mechanism.
However, it should prompt that the language of blackmail has no prospects whereas Tel Aviv may have mutually beneficial important issues to discuss in a human language.